The United States Constitution was established primarily because of the widely recognized failures of its predecessor, the Articles of Confederation, to adequately address "collective-action problems" facing the states. These problems included funding the national government, regulating foreign and interstate commerce, and defending the nation from attack. Meeting such challenges required the states to cooperate or coordinate their behavior, but they often struggled to do so both inside and outside the Confederation Congress. By empowering Congress to solve collective-action problems, and by creating a national executive and judiciary to enforce federal law, the Constitution promised a substantially more effective federal government.

An important read for scholars, lawyers, judges, and students alike, Neil Siegel's The Collective-Action Constitution addresses how the U.S. Constitution is, in a fundamental sense, the Collective-Action Constitution. Any faithful account of what the Constitution is for and how it should be interpreted must include the primary structural purpose of empowering the federal government to solve collective-action problems for the states and preventing them from causing such problems. This book offers a thorough examination of the collective-action principles animating the structure of the Constitution and how they should be applied to meet many of the most daunting challenges facing American society today.

Neil S. Siegel is the David W. Ichel Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at Duke Law School, where he also serves as Associate Dean for Intellectual Life and Director of the Summer Institute on Law and Policy. He has been writing, teaching, speaking, debating, and testifying about the U.S. Constitution, constitutional law, and the federal courts since 2004. A former law clerk to Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, he has worked in the United States Senate on the nominations of six current Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Introduction

Part I: Thinking Constitutionally, and Collectively
1. Foundations: McCulloch
2. The New "Science of Politics"

Part II: A Collective-Action Theory of the Federal Structure-and Its Limits
3. The Roles of the States and the Interstate Compacts Clause
4. The Necessity of Federal Power: Taxing, Spending, and Borrowing
5. Interstate Commerce, Foreign Commerce, and Related Principles
6. National Security, Positive Externalities, and National Uniformity
7. Executive Energy, Judicial Authority, and Federal Supremacy
8. Races to the Bottom, Interstate Coordination, and Territorial Empire
9. Constitutional Rights, Collective Action, and Individual Action

Part III: Perfecting the Collective-Action Constitution
10. The Collective Costs of Strict Supermajority Requirements
11. The Problem of Congressional Gridlock

Conclusion

Postscript on Methodology

Index of Constitutional Provisions
Index of Cases
General Index