Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics
by Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul , Fred Miller, Jr , Jeffrey PaulFormat: Paperback
Pub. Date: 2008-01-28
Publisher(s): Cambridge University Press
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Summary
Do we desire things because they are good, or are they good because we desire them? This question gets to the heart of the debate between moral objectivists and moral subjectivists. Objectivists answer that we desire things because they are good (that is, things are good or bad independently of our subjective mental states), while subjectivists answer that things are good because we desire them (that is, whether things are good or bad depends on our subjective mental states). A related question concerns the existence of disagreements over values and how these disagreements are to be explained. Does it make sense to account for moral disagreement by claiming, as the moral relativist does, that something might be good for one person but not good for another?
Table of Contents
| Introduction | p. v |
| Acknowledgments | p. xvi |
| Contributors | p. xvii |
| Substantive Moral Theory | p. 1 |
| Virtue and Nature | p. 28 |
| The Importance of Metaphysical Realism for Ethical Knowledge | p. 56 |
| Why Moral Judgments Can Be Objective | p. 100 |
| The Importance of the Subject in Objective Morality: Distinguishing Objective from Intrinsic Value | p. 126 |
| Evaluative Concepts and Objective Values: Rand on Moral Objectivity | p. 149 |
| Aristotelian Constructivism | p. 182 |
| Moral Construction as a Task: Sources and Limits | p. 214 |
| Constructing Normative Objectivity in Ethics | p. 237 |
| What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us about Moral Objectivity? | p. 267 |
| Imaginative Resistance and Psychological Necessity | p. 301 |
| Objectivism and Relational Good | p. 314 |
| Foundations in Aquinas's Ethics | p. 350 |
| Revisionary Intuitionism | p. 368 |
| Moral Objectivity | p. 393 |
| Index | p. 411 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
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